The amount of non-pit plutonium is complicated by several factors:

the inherent difficulty of measuring and accounting for plutonium;

the fact that many materials with 10-30% plutonium content are poorly characterized;

the changes in U.S. policy regarding waste vs. recoverable materials;

whether plutonium in pits was a part of the declassified inventory at Rocky Flats and SRS

The ownership of the plutonium within the DOE bureaucracy and the lack of final decisions regarding the fate of numerous materials.

When Production Stopped

Prior to 1990, when nuclear weapons production was in high gear, “the vast majority of fissile material scrap and materials from retired weapons was recycled. It was less costly to recover fissile materials from high assay scrap and retired weapons than to produce new material. As a result, very little scrap containing fissile material was considered surplus. Consequently, these materials were designated, handled, and packaged for short-term storage.”

In 1989, when the U.S. stopped producing special nuclear materials and numerous facilities were shut down, there was no long-term standard for storing plutonium. In fact, not much thought was even given to storage until it became a problem:

By 1994 DOE had finally developed a standard for long-term storage-up to 50 years-of non-pit plutonium metals and oxides, commonly called the 3013 Standard. However, between 1989 and 1994 DOE made insignificant progress resolving the actual problem.

Change began in April 1994 when the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued its first Technical Report. Plutonium Storage Safety at Major Department of Energy Facilities
addressed all unencapsulated, separated plutonium., leaving out plutonium in pits, unirradiated nuclear fuel, and sealed sources. The report chastised the DOE for not clearly recognizing many of the hazards associated with plutonium storage, such as potential fires, explosions, and pressurization of containers.^xxiv (Three years later a major chemical explosion forced Hanford to shut down its Plutonium Finishing Plant.)

A month later the Board issued Recommendation 94-1 for this plutonium and other special nuclear materials. At the top of the list of nine recommendations encompassed within 94-1 was the recommendation to:

Also in 1994 the DOE conducted a detailed plutonium vulnerability investigation and published a landmark document of the results, including the detailing of plutonium holdings down to the gram level at numerous “small holding” sites documenting approximately 26.0 MT of non-pit separated plutonium.. In February 1995, a few months after publishing the vulnerability report, the Department sent its first plan with new plutonium estimates (Table 1-3) for implementing Recommendation 94-1 to the Defense Board, and acknowledged the urgency of the issue:

“The Department acknowledges and shares the Board's concerns and has developed this integrated program plan to address these urgent problems.”^xxvi

Not included in DOE's 94-1 implementation plan were 4.4 to 4.6 MT of plutonium in unirradiated fuel:

· 0.6 MT of plutonium in unused FFTF mixed oxxide fuel clad in 17,000 MOX fuel pins at Hanford;
· 0.2 MT to 0.4 MT of plutonium in unclad FFTF fuel pellets at Hanford;
· 0.3 MT of unused ZPPR fuel in 21,000 pins of mixed oxide fuel in Idaho (Figure 2-2)
· 3.5 MT of unused ZPPR plates within 29,000 plates of metal alloy fuel (Figure 2-3);

This provides more evidence that the 26.0 MT in the vulnerability report at sites other than Pantex was non-pit plutonium and did not include plutonium in pits, meaning that the original inventory at Rocky Flats was closer to 16.0 MT.

Implementation of DOE's nuclear materials stabilization plan has been hindered by several factors, many of them political:

· The political decision to "accelerate closure"at Rocky Flats, with an artificial deadline for closing all plutonium facilities by 2006;
· The political decision to pursue disposition of surplus plutonium through the "dual-strategy" of both plutonium fuel use and immobilization;
· The lack of commitment to safe and secure storage within the Department of Energy;
· The issue of who "owns" this plutonium, as it is managed by four DOE departments Offices of Nuclear Energy, Defense Programs, Environmental Management, and Fissile Materials Disposition.
· DOE's hopelessly fragmented approach to implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), with the total plutonium program being addressed in several environmental impact statements.
· The 3013 standard has changed three times (3013-96, 30-13-99, and 3013-00).
· The nature of the materials, especially since the amount of plutonium contained in the complex was minor compared to the total quantities of materials that contained plutonium. (Figure 1-x_) .
· In 1999 DOE stopped construction of a cornerstone of its implementation plan, the Actinide Packaging and Stabilization Facility (APSF), leaving a gaping hole in the ground at Savannah River Site where excavation work was almost complete.

The fate of most of these materials remains unclear. One option is to dispose more plutonium as a waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. A more recent scheme proposed by the National Laboratories is to truck hundreds of tonnes of residues to SRS and separate and purify the plutonium. in the SRS canyons. The goal would be to increase-by 6-7 tonnes-:the amount of weapons grade plutonium and improve our negotiating stance with Russia." ^xxvii

Because of the variations in DOE reporting, the actual inventory remains murky. Following are BREDL's estimates for the total number of items containing plutonium, and the plutonium content within those items.

Figure 2-1. This graphic illustrates the quantity of materials compared to the plutonium in those materials. Much of the non-pit plutonium is not weapons-usable, yet the necessity to stabilize these materials from a health and safety standpoint results in weapons-usable plutonium. Source: DOE/ID-10631, Plutonium Focus Area. 1995.

Plutonium in Solutions

In the plutonium vulnerability report, DOE estimated a total of 700 kilograms (0.7 MT) of plutonium contained in various concentrations within 400,000 liters of solutions with high risks of criticality, explosions, and leaks:

· 143 kilograms at Rocky Flats
· 360 kilograms at Hanford
· a classified amount--estimated at approximately 200 kilograms--at Savannah River Site;

DOE's contractors have stabilized 90% of the plutonium solutions in terms of total volume, but only about 30 % of the solutions in terms of plutonium content:

· 43 kilograms of plutonium remains at Rocky Flats in 2,000 liters of solution in piping in 6 facilities;
· An estimated 110 kilograms of plutonium remains in H-Canyon at SRS in 34,000 liters of solution;*
· 341 kilograms of plutonium remains at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant in 4,270 liters of solution
· A total of 494 kilograms, or approximately 0.5 MT, of plutonium in 40,270 liters of solutions.

Figure 2-2. Plutonium Ingots.

Plutonium Metal

As of June 2000, DOE reported 8,951.3 kilograms (8.951 MT) of plutonium metal contained in 6,361 items at 9 different sites:

· 6600 kilograms (6.6 MT) in 3403 containers at Rocky Flats;
· 700 kilograms (0.7 MT) in 475 containers in Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant
· 1133 kilograms (1.133 MT) in 2060 containers at Los Alamos
· 490 kilograms (0.49 MT) in 230 containers at SRS
· 0.45 kilograms (0.00045 MT) in 210 containers at Argonne East National Laboratory in Chicago;
· 20 kilograms (0.020 MT) in 50 containers at LLNL.
· 0.855 kilograms (0.00085 MT) in 20 containers at the Mound Plant in Ohio
· 0.3013 KG (0.0003 MT) in 30 containers at Oak Ridge;
· 6.7 kg (0.0067 MT) in 5 containers at Sandia National Laboratory. .

About 7.6 MT of this material is considered surplus, based on 28.9 MT of metals declared surplus minus the 21.3 MT of surplus plutonium in pits at Pantex.

1.0 MT of this material is categorized as fuel-grade plutonium. In all likelihood this includes the the 275 plutonium-aluminum alloy items at Hanford.

Plutonium Oxide

Figure 2-3. A can of plutonium oxide powder at Rocky Flats.

DOE has approximately 12,540 items of plutonium oxides with greater than 50% plutonium content, for a total of 6.35 MT of plutonium. Virtually none of this plutonium meets the long-term 3013 storage standard:

· 3,200 kilograms (3.2 MT) of plutonium within 3,296 items content at Rocky Flats;
· 1,500 kilograms (1.5 MT) of plutonium in 2,800 Pu oxide items and 2,300 plutonium-uranium oxide items at Hanford
· 800 kilograms (0.8 MT) of plutonium in 800 containers of Pu oxide at SRS;
· 721 kilograms (0.721 MT) of plutonium in more than 2,000 Pu oxide containers at Los Alamos;
· 102 kilograms (0.102 MT) in 92 containers at LLNL;
· 28.1 kilograms (0.0028 MT) in 107 containers at Mound;
· 1.706 kilograms (0.0017 MT) in 83 containers at Oak Ridge;
· 1.4 kilograms (0.0014 MT) in 10 containers at Sandia National Laboratory; and
· 0.014 kilograms in 354 items at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.

Plutonium in Unirradiated Nuclear Fuel

Figure 2-4. 21,000 ZPPR Fuel Pins like the one pictured here are stored at Argonne National Laboratory West, Idaho and contain a reported 0.3 MT of fuel-grade plutonium mixed with uranium oxide to make Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel.

As of June 2000, DOE had more than 50,000 items of clad, unused, unirradiated fuel containing a total of 4.4 to 4.6 MT of plutonium.

DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy retains control this plutonium. Until November 1999, the ZPPR fuels (Figures 2-4, 2-5) and FFTF Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel (not pictured) were scheduled to be processed at the Plutonium Immobilization Plant at Savannah River Site. This idea was withdrawn in November 1999.

Figure 2-5. ZPPR Fuel Plates. 22,000 of these plates containing a reported 3.5 MT of plutonium are presently stored at Argonne National Laboratory-West within the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The ZPPR fuel contains varying percentages of uranium and plutonium alloyed with either aluminum or molybdenum to make a material that is resistant to oxidation. Some plates are coated with nickel to increase the resistance to oxidation. Source: UCRL-ID-131608, Rev. 3, PIP-00-035

Processing 50,000 pieces of old unused fuel with high concentrations of americium-241 necessitated planning for remotely controlled processing of these materials. Plans for dealing with such highly radioactive materials greatly contributed to increased costs of a plutonium immobilization plant.

The cost of abandoning this path has not been determined. DOE is now considering calling the ZPPR fuel a "national asset material" but has yet to determine a future use.^xxviii

Plutonium Residues

Residues is a catch all phrase for "material containing plutonium that was generated during the separation and purification of plutonium or during the manufacture of plutonium-bearing components for nuclear weapons."^xxix In 1990 these materials were assumed to have enough plutonium remaining to be recoverable for future operations. Today, the plutonium cannot be used in weapons without substantial processing and purification and it is mostly being treated as waste.

Residues currently consist of an estimated 6.350 MT of plutonium in 29,530 items:

· 3000 kilograms (3.0 MT) in 20,532 items totaling more than 100 metric tonnes of materials in Buildings 371 and 707 at Rocky Flats, of which nearly 10,000 items remain to be stabilized;
· 1,500 MT in 1300 containers at Hanford;
· 1,400 kg in nearly 6,000 items at LANL;
· 400 kilograms of plutonium in 1306 items of miscellaneous residues in the F-Area at the Savannah River Site;^xxx
· 35 kilograms in 202 items at LLNL;(114 cans of ash)
· 3 kilograms in 39 items at Mound;
· less than 1 kilogram in 12 items at Argonne East;
· 0.1 kg in 12 items at Oak Ridge;
· less than 1 kg in 250 items at Lawrence Berkeley;

This is the least certain and most poorly defined of all categories for the following reasons:

1. With a few exceptions, this should be categorized as plutonium waste by U.S. standards, since DOE intends to "dilute" most of the residues to attain less than 10% plutonium by weight and therefore meet WIPP acceptance criteria. The desire to "bury" nearly 7 MT of plutonium that would be recycled under Russian policy clearly undermines claims made by U.S. plutonium fuel advocates that Russia opposes the U.S. burying plutonium, and therefore the U.S. must pursue the MOX plutonium fuel option.

2. Decommissioning of plutonium facilities across the nuclear weapons complex will result in more plutonium wastes. This is because the category called "holdup"-plutonium in pipes, glove boxes, ductwork, etc-has never been quantified and is considered part of the unaccounted-for plutonium.

3. A recent proposal by DOE and its labs, called the 2025 vision, holds open the prospects of processing much of the residues at the canyons at SRS in order to increase weapons grade plutonium inventories.

Plutonium in Waste:

In 1996 DOE estimated 3.4 MT of plutonium as "lost" through normal operations and categorized as plutonium wastes (not including plutonium released through smokestacks or in wastewater either routinely or by accident) that are buried or stored at 8 sites:

· 1.522 MT buried or stored at Hanford;
· 1.108 MT buried or stored at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; with 0.002 MT of this credited to ANLW;
· 0.610 MT buried or stored at Los Alamos;
· 0.575 MT buried or stored at SRS;
· 0.047 MT buried or stored at Rocky Flats;
· 0.016 MT stored at Nevada Test Site from past nuclear weapons accidents;

U.S. Surplus Plutonium

U.S. surplus plutonium figures have changed substantially, although these changes are obscured by unclear management plans. In 1996 the U.S. declared 38.2 MT of weapon-grade plutonium to be surplus. The common belief is that the U.S. has 50 metric tonnes of surplus plutonium, but at no time did the U.S. declare an active inventory of 50 metric tonnes of weapons-usable plutonium.

2.1 MT of the non-pit weapon-grade plutonium is estimated to be nonsurplus based on the following:

· DOE declared 21.3 MT of plutonium at Pantex to be surplus, leaving 44.8 MT of plutonium in pit form as stockpile plutonium;
· DOE declared 38.2 MT of weapon-grade plutonium to be surplus, leaving 46.9 MT of weapon-grade plutonium as nonsurplus;

The Nominal 50 MT

This confusion is a function of DOE planning efforts. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition spent five years conducting environmental impact statements (EIS) on the plutonium disposition options. The EIS processes consistently used 50.0 metric tonnes of surplus plutonium as a "nominal planning figure,"^xxxi broken down as:

· 31.8 MT of "clean metal," mostly plutonium contained in weapon components (pits), designated to the MOX route;
· 18.2 MT of plutonium contained in an array of forms considered physically unsuitable or economically unfeasible to separate and purify for use in MOX and designated for the immobilization disposition route.

Figure 2-6. Projected Feed for Plutonium Disposition.

Several assumptions lie within the "nominal planning figures (figure 2-6):

· materials will be pre-processed before the disposition steps begin. In other words, the planning figures are based on expected conditions, not real conditions.
· included was 7.0 MT of metals "anticipated" to be surplus if START II induced more weapons dismantlement;
· not included was the 7.5 MT of plutonium in irradiated fuel.

The Real Surplus

DOE did report approximately 52.5 metric tonnes (MT) of surplus plutonium (see Table 1-5) that included:

· 38.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium and 14.3 MT of fuel-grade plutonium.
· A net amount of surplus weapons-usable plutonium in the existing inventory of 43.0 MT.^xxxii

The 9.5 MT of plutonium not weapons-usable in its present state, broken down as:

· 7.5 MT of plutonium contained in irradiated mixed-oxide (MOX) and metal alloy fuel that already met the spent fuel standard.
· 2.0 MT of material commonly known as "residues" with low concentrations of plutonium for "which extraction of plutonium would not be practical and which is expected to be processed and repackaged for disposal as TRU [transuranic] waste" at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico.

The Changing Surplus

The following changes have occurred since the surplus inventory was announced:

1. There is now 3.0 MT of plutonium in residues scheduled for disposal at WIPP and this material is identified as weapon-grade plutonium.. The addition of 1.0 MT to this route occurred when DOE rescinded its decision to send 1.0 MT of plutonium in Rocky Flats "Sands, Slags, and Crucibles" to the reprocessing canyons at SRS.

2. In 1997 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory reported only 51.3 MT as the "latest estimate"^xxxiii of surplus plutonium within a table identical to one in 1997,^xxxiv with the difference being the removal of 1.2 MT of plutonium in the following forms:

· 0.8 tonnes of fuel-grade plutonium in irradiated fuel;
· 0.2 MT tonnes of fuel-grade plutonium in unirradiated reactor fuel;
· 0.1 MT of fuel-grade plutonium oxide;
· 0.1 MT of weapon-grade plutonium metal;

The reasons for this change are unknown and have not been explained by DOE. However, in 1998 plutonium pits were reclassified (see Part 3) and some surplus pits were reidentified as "national assets." Also, in 1998 Los Alamos received "permission from the politicians" to divert some "nickel-sized" pieces of plutonium from its pit disassembly and conversion "disposition" demonstration project to its nuclear weapons program for plutonium aging studies.^xxxv

3. In November 1999, prior to issuing a Record of Decision on the SPDEIS in January 2000, but after finishing the final SPDEIS, DOE removed the unirradiated ZPPR fuel plates and oxides pins from the surplus inventory and declared it "Programmatic Use material."^xxxvi DOE failed to mention this change in its Record of Decision and apparently did not inform the designers of the Immobilization Facility until after January 1, 2000.^xxxvii

In June 2000 DOE submitted its Integrated Nuclear Materials to Congress in which they described an active surplus plutonium inventory of 52.5 MT but added the disclaimer that "a majority of the excess, approximately 48 MT, has no programmatic use." DOE then described how it removed more than 4 MT from the surplus inventory:

"A small portion of the 52.5 MT supports programmatic uses such as basic scientific research, criticality research, and production of medical isotopes. Most of this is in the form of fuel for the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) and Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF)."

"The Department is now considering retaining the ZPPR fuel as a national resource at ANL-W. The Department is currently preparing a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) (DOE, 1999i) to consider the potential impacts of expanded nuclear facilities to accommodate new civilian nuclear energy research and development efforts and isotope production missions, including the role of the FFTF."^xxxviii

Table 2-3 of this document identifies the ZPPR fuel as "in storage pending future use."

The U.S. Russian Agreement

Adding to the confusion is the U.S./Russian bilateral plutonium disposition agreement signed on September 1, 2000. Plutonium "disposition" is a catchphrase for putting plutonium in a highly irradiated storage environment. Instead of 50 MT to be "disposed," the agreement calls for only disposing 34.5 MT. DOE has continued to incorrectly declare 52.5 MT of surplus plutonium in the active inventory (see Figures 2-7 and 2-8 on following page).

One unfortunate consistency in plutonium management has been overlapping and poorly integrated bureaucracies. DOE's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) and the Office of Environmental Management (EM) have never presented a cohesive plan for managing non-pit plutonium to the public, and they can't seem to agree on the numbers:

· EM incorrectly described the 14.3 MT of non-weapon grade plutonium as "non-weapon-capable" even though DOE defines weapons-usable as "all plutonium except that present in spent [irradiated] fuel and plutonium which contains greater than 10% plutonium 238."^xxxix
· Although WIPP was never said to be part of the fissile materials disposition program in terms of surplus plutonium, both parties show 3.1 MT of weapons-grade plutonium being disposed of at WIPP. OFMD's chart states the material will be "diluted in waste" and sent to WIPP; whereas the EM chart simply shows this waste being sent to WIPP;
· EM inaccurately claimed that 4.8 MT of reactor fuel was surplus.

Figure 2-7. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition

Figure 2-8. Office of Environmental Management.